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I show in this paper that in an overlapping generations economy with production à la Diamond (1970) in 
which the agents can only save in terms of capital (i.e. with no asset bubbles à la Tirole (1985) or public 
debt as in Diamond (1965)), there is a period-by-period balanced ﬁscal policy supporting a steady state 
allocation that Pareto-improves upon the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state (without having 
to resort to intergenerational transfers) if there is no ﬁrst generation or the economy starts there. A transition 
from the competitive equilibrium steady state to this other allocation is also Pareto-improving if the former 
is dynamically ineﬃcient, but even in the dynamically eﬃcient case if the elasticity of output to capital is 
high enough. This intervention allows every subsequent generation to attain, as a competitive equilibrium 
outcome, the highest utility attainable at a steady state through the existing markets for the consumption 
good  and  the  production  factors.  The  active  ﬁscal  policy  consists  of  taxing  (or  subsidizing,  in  the 
dynamically  eﬃcient  case)  linearly  the  returns  to  capital,  while  balancing  the  budget  period  by  period 
through a lump-sum transfer (or tax, respectively) on second period income. This policy does not ﬁnance 
any  public  spending,  since  there  is  none  in  the  model.  The  only  purpose  of  the  intervention  is  to 
decentralize  as  a  competitive  equilibrium  the  steady  state  allocation  that  maximizes  the  utility  of  the 
representative agent among all steady state allocations attainable through the existing markets.  
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Whether the taxation of capital returns is a good or bad idea is a recurrent issue
in the economic literature.1 Arguments against and in favor are put forward by,
respectively, those who would like to see taxes on capital income eliminated (or
at least reduced) because of the ineciencies they may introduce in the allocation
of resources (as in Chamley (1986), Judd (1987)), and those who think that taxes
on capital income serve a purpose if only because they may help undo some inef-
ciencies due to the incompleteness of markets (e.g. oversaving as a self-insurance
against uninsurable risks, as in Aiyagari (1995), Chamley (2001)). Actually, the
conclusions depend crucially on the framework in which the question is addressed,
namely the neoclassical growth model or the overlapping generations model. In
eect, in the ideal case in which there is no uncertainty, while in the neoclassical
growth model the taxation of capital returns induces a distortion of the compet-
itive equilibrium factor prices that can only create ineciencies (not surprisingly,
given the Pareto optimality of the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium allocations
of this model), it turns out that the breakdown of the First Welfare Theorem in
the overlapping generations economy with production in Diamond (1965) prevents
to replicate straightforwardly this kind of argument in that setup.
Diamond (1970) argued nevertheless that, even in the overlapping generations setup
of Diamond (1965), an increase in the tax rate of capital returns can decrease the
steady state utility of the representative agent, so that a reduction or outright
elimination of taxes on capital returns would be Pareto-improving, even if the taxes
raised were given back as a lump-sum to the same generation. Still, Diamond (1970)
established this negative impact of the taxation (even compensated) of capital re-
turns on the steady state representative agent's utility only for the case in which
the capital returns are actually taxed (as opposed to subsidized) and the after-tax
rate of return does exceed the rate of growth of the population. One can add that,
although Diamond (1970) did not consider the symmetric case, it follows from his
analysis too that, if the returns to capital are actually linearly subsidized (by means
of a lump-sum tax raised from the same generation), a decrease in the rate at which
they are subsidized decreases the steady state utility of the representative agent if
the after-subsidy rate of return does not exceed the rate of growth of the population.
The result provided in Diamond (1970) is actually a partial answer to a more gen-
1See, for instance, Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999) and Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2007)
3eral question that can be addressed in the framework of the overlapping generations
economy with production of Diamond (1965). This question is whether the laissez-
faire competitive equilibrium steady state maximizes or not the utility of the rep-
resentative agent among the steady states that are attainable through the existing
markets for the consumption good and the factors of production. The answer to
this question is negative: even among just the steady states in which factors are
remunerated by their marginal productivities and without transfers across agents,
the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state does not maximize the repre-
sentative agent's utility.2 Indeed, given the typical ineciency of the laissez-faire
competitive equilibrium steady state, all the agents could be better-o if they saved
dierently from what they choose to save at that steady state, even if their labor and
savings are still priced by their marginal productivities. In eect, since the return
to the savings of any given generation is the marginal productivity of the aggregate
capital next period, and hence is determined by the aggregate savings today, all the
members of a generation could in principle coordinate to manipulate the returns
to their own savings in order to implement such improvement.3 Of course under
competitive conditions no agent has incentives to deviate from the competitive be-
havior for lack of a coordination device, and this room from improvement is thus
left unexploited at competitive equilibria.
But then the question arises of whether some adequate government intervention
would allow to decentralize as a competitive equilibrium the steady state that pro-
vides all the agents the highest possible utility among the steady states attainable
through the good and factor markets. The answer to this second question is yes,
and the right intervention just requires |in the case in which the laissez-faire com-
petitive equilibrium steady state over-accumulates capital compared to the steady
state that maximizes the representative agent among all feasible steady states, and
is hence dynamically inecient| to tax linearly each generation's capital returns
(at a rate depending on the savings of the previous generation) and, simultane-
ously, to make to the same generation a second period lump-sum transfer equal
to the amount that would have been raised from the previous generation if it had
been taxed at the current generation rate.4 In doing so, at the steady state no
2Except for the knife-edge case in which the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state
happens to maximize it already among all feasible steady states.
3Note that, for an economy running from  1 to +1 (and hence without a rst generation),
if all generations behaved this way, then each generation's utility could be improved upon the
laissez-faire steady state competitive equilibrium, even in the dynamically ecient case.
4Contrarily, in the case in which the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state under-
accumulates capital, the returns to savings need rather to be subsidized and a second period
lump-sum tax needs to be raised.
4resources are redistributed across agents or generations, and the government does
never incur in any decit or superavit. Actually, a similar policy is considered in
Diamond (1970)5 in order to asses the impact of taxes on capital returns in this
setup. Nevertheless, it turns out that, in the dynamically inecient case, the tax
rate that implements as a competitive equilibrium the steady state maximizing the
representative agent utility (among those attainable through the existing markets)
is such that the after-tax return to savings does not exceed the rate of growth of the
population, so that the result in Diamond (1970) does not apply. Similarly, in the
dynamically ecient case, the subsidy rate that implements the utility maximizing
steady state attainable through the existing markets is such that the after-subsidy
return to savings does exceed the rate of growth of the population, so that Diamond
(1970) does not apply either.
It is worth noting that in Diamond (1970) no other market exists for any asset
(other than capital) in which the agents could save as well, and that might allow
for intergenerational transfers. More specically, no asset bubble  a la Tirole (1985)
or public debt as in Diamond (1965), that would support the rst-best steady state
exists. I choose to maintain this assumption in this paper for the following reasons.
Firstly, the absence of nancial markets allowing for intergenerational transfers may
re
ect of an economy with an under-developped nancial system and may therefore
be of interest to address development issues. But second and more importantly, a
conceptual problem seems to undermine the implementation of the rst-best steady
state through the introduction of at money or debt. In eect, as it is well known
in the overlapping generations economy with production of Diamond (1965) the
rst-best steady state can in principle be attained as a competitive outcome if the
agents can put part of their savings into some intrinsically worthless asset (a bubble
 a la Tirole (1985) or public debt as in Diamond (1965)) that allows to implement
the necessary intergenerational transfers. Nevertheless, since in the absence of un-
certainty the returns to physical capital as well as to the nancial asset have to be
equal at equilibrium (in eect, the rst-best steady state requires typically strictly
positive holdings of both assets), the agents are actually indierent about the com-
position of their savings portfolio, and hence the latter is not determined by their
decisions. Only by chance would the agents choose precisely the portfolio that sup-
ports the Pareto ecient steady state.6 In other words, the implementation of the
rst-best steady state by means of, say, at money is not an equilibrium outcome
5In Diamond (1970) the lump-sum transfer equals in each period exactly the amount raised from
that same generation, and hence contingent to the decisions of the very agents that will receive
it. On the contrary, here the tax rates and transfers are determined each period by past decisions
and cannot therefore be subject to manipulation. At the steady state both nonetheless coincide.
6That the right amount of savings in terms of physical capital is the one that makes the marginal
5in the sense of being the result of a collection of compatible optimal decisions, since
the composition of the agents saving portfolio is decided by no one in the model
at the rst-best steady state.7 This poses a problem for the conceptual soundness
of the decentralization of the rst-best steady state by means of an intrinsically
worthless nancial asset that is beyond the scope of this paper, and that I leave to
be addressed elsewhere (see D avila (2008)). As a consequence, in this paper (as in
Diamond (1970)) agents are assumed to be able to save in terms of physical capital
only.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 characterizes the competitive
equilibria of the economy (mainly to x notation), characterizes the competitive
equilibrium steady state and shows that, even without resorting to the introduc-
tion of asset bubbles, there exists a reallocation that Pareto-improves over the
competitive steady state whenever the latter is dynamically inecient, but also in
the dynamically ecient case if output is suciently elastic to capital. Section 3
establishes that any competitive equilibrium steady state providing the represen-
tative agent a utility smaller than that of the rst-best steady state does not even
maximize the agent's utility among the steady states attainable trough the exist-
ing good and factors markets (Proposition 1). Section 4 characterizes the steady
state that achieves this maximization (Proposition 2), and establishes that it is a
laissez-faire competitive equilibrium outcome if, and only if, it coincides with the
rst-best steady state. As a matter of fact, the rst-best steady state, the utility-
maximizing steady state attainable through the good and factor markets, and the
competitive equilibrium steady state are either all identical or all distinct (Propo-
sition 3). Section 5 characterizes the scal policy that allows to decentralize the
utility-maximizing steady state attainable through the good and factor markets as
a competitive equilibrium (Proposition 4). The policy requires taxing or subsidizing
the returns on savings depending on whether this steady state over-accumulates or
under-accumulates capital with respect to the rst-best (Proposition 5).
productivity of capital equal to the rate of growth of the population does not follow from any
agent's (or rm's) decision problem.
7It has been suggested to me that this problem may be of the same nature than that of the
innocuous indeterminacy at equilibrium of the production plan of a rm with a constant returns
to scale technology, which is widely assumed to result in production adjusting to a demand that
is well determined by prices. Nevertheless, it is my view that the indeterminacy of the savings
portfolio I am referring to is of a dierent, more disturbing nature, since in this case in the money
market, each period, both sides of the market are identical, they are both the same representative
agent, and face then the same indeterminacy. As a result, contrarily to what happens in the
constant return to technology case, there is no well-determined other side of the market able to
anchor here the indeterminate side. Rather, in the savings portfolio problem the decisions of both
sides of the money market are indeterminate each period at the rst-best steady state equilibrium.
62. Competitive equilibria of the productive overlapping
generations economy without financial assets
Consider the economy in Diamond (1965,1970), i.e. consider rst an agent living for
two periods, t and t+1, in which he is, say, young and old respectively. When young
he can work l hours four a real hourly wage of wt. His real income when young wtl
can then be either consumed immediately or saved for consumption when old. No
other way of saving is available to him. Let ct
t denote the share of his income wtl that
he consumes when young, and kt+1 be his share of income saved for consumption
when old. He can lend his savings as capital for a rate of return of rt+1, and then
consume the returns (1 + rt+1)kt+1 when old. Let ct
t+1 denote his consumption
when old. The agent evaluates consumption by a utility function u and discounts
future utilities by a discount factor  2 (0;1].8 This agent faces then the problem










t + kt+1 = wtl
ct
t+1 = (1 + rt+1)kt+1
(1)
for given values of wt and rt+1 (without loss of generality, capital is supposed not
to depreciate at all, as in Diamond (1965,1970)). Under standard assumptions, the
agent's optimal saving kt+1 is then completely characterized to be a function of wt





= 1 + rt+1 (2)
that equalizes the marginal rate of substitution of old-age consumption to young-age
consumption and the rate of return to savings. The agent's optimal consumption
when young and old are then determined by kt+1 through his budget constraints
above.
Suppose now this agent is one of the many members of the generation born in period
t of an economy whose population grows at a rate 1+n > 0, and whose many rms
produce consumption good out of capital and labor through a constant returns to
8Just for notational convenience, separability and discounting do not play any role whatsoever in
what follows.
7scale Cobb-Douglas production function F(K;L) = KL1 , with 0 <  < 1.
Under perfect competition, the wage and the rental rate of capital are determined,
at each period t, by the marginal productivities of labor and capital respectively.
Since the capital Kt available at any given period t consists of the previous period
aggregate savings (1 + n)t 1kt, and aggregate labor Lt is (1 + n)tl, then the wage










(given the homogeneity of degree 1 of the production function) where kt is the
amount that each of the agents born in the previous period t   1 decided to save.
Note that the agents' budget constraints guarantee the feasibility of the allocation




t = (1 + rt)kt (4)
and the (1 + n)t contemporaneous young agents
ct
t + kt+1 = wtl (5)





























The competitive equilibrium allocations are, therefore, completely characterized by
the following per capita savings dynamics that results from each agent's utility













8More specically, a competitive equilibrium steady state of this overlapping gen-
erations economy is characterized by a constant sequence of per capita savings kc






u0((1 + FK( kc
1+n;l))kc)




Thus, if at some date t the available per capita level of savings |made by genera-
tion t   1| happens to be kc,9 then the only allocation the agents will be able to
attain under laissez-faire through the existing markets for the good and factors of
production is the allocation in which every generation t0  t obtains a consumption
prole (cc
0;cc




1+n;l))kc). Nevertheless, this competi-
tive equilibrium steady state allocation is Pareto-dominated by the following one if
kc > kg, where kg is the level of per capital savings that maximizes the net output
per capita k
1+n + F( k
1+n;l)   k each period:
(1) generations t0  t   1 get the same consumption as before,
(2) generation t obtains the consumption prole10


































9Or, equivalently, generation t   1 is actually a rst generation born old at date t that happens
to be endowed with kc units of capital |and consumes hence (1 + FK( kc
1+n;l))kc.
10Note that ~ c0 > 0 because of kc > kg, since this implies kc > k (as established in the appendix)
and hence that ~ c0 > c
0  0.
9Note that, by construction, the new allocation above is feasible. Also, note that
(i) generations t0  t   1 see their utility remain unchanged, and are therefore
indierent between the two allocations; (ii) the new allocation provides nevertheless
to all generations t0  t+1 the highest utility they could ever get at a steady state
trading in the existing markets (and hence not smaller than the one they get in
the competitive equilibrium steady state); and (iii) for generation t the utility is
higher than at the competitive equilibrium steady state as long as kc > k, which
is the case when kc > kg (as established in the appendix), i.e. when kc is said to be
dynamically inecient (actually, generation t gets an utility even higher than that




















= u(~ c0) + u(~ c1):
(12)
This fact is illustrated in Figure 1 where, for a Cobb-Douglass technology, have
also been depicted the curve of possible steady state proles of consumption c(k) =
(FL( k
1+n;l)l k;(1+FK( k
1+n;l))k) attainable through the good and factors markets
(parametrized by the initial level of per capita savings k) and the feasibility line
corresponding to the highest possible net output (attained for the per capita level
of savings kg).
10Figure 1
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g
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In the case kg > kc, necessarily k > kc (see the lemma in the appendix) and
therefore (12) above does not go through. As a matter of fact, the change in the









;l)l   k < FL(
kc
1 + n








so that the change in utility for generation t depends on which of the these two
opposite changes in consumption, when young and old, overcomes the other (see
Figure 2). For instance, for an  in the Cobb-Douglass production function close
enough to 1 the productivity of labor will be insensitive enough to the level of
capital for ~ c0 to be arbitrarily close to c
0 and make, hence, the utility of generation
t increase in this case as well.
11Note that, as depicted in Figure 2, the inequality FL( kc
1+n;l)l   k < FL( k
1+n;l)l   k holds
also.
11Figure 2
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Of course, the previous allocation is not a competitive equilibrium allocation under
laissez-faire, since the only competitive equilibrium starting from the level of per
capita savings kc is precisely the steady state kc. So there is no hope that the
economy will attain this Pareto-improving allocation without public intervention.
The question remains nonetheless whether the economy can attain it with some
minimal public intervention, more specically within the framework of the existing
markets (i.e. without resorting to redistributions).12 The answer to this question
is yes, and in order to establish this (and to provide the policy that implements
this allocation), I consider rst in the next section the inter-temporal allocation
problem as if there were no rst generation. Indeed, recall that the per capita level
of savings k with which we have constructed the allocation Pareto-improving over
the competitive equilibrium steady state allocation, is in fact the per capita level of
savings that maximizes the utility of the representative agent among all the steady
state allocations attainable in such an economy with no rst generation.
12As it is well known, the introduction of asset bubbles allows to do even better, but this possibility
is not considered here for the reasons explained in the introduction.
123. Comparing steady states
Consider the question of which is the best technologically feasible steady state if
we are free to choose the initial level of savings for the rst generation.13 It is
well known that the competitive equilibrium steady state level of per capita savings
kc solution to (8) needs not be the one that allows to maximize the utility of the
representative agents among all feasible steady states. That is to say, kc is typically
distinct from the rst-best per capita savings kg that follows from solving
















;l) = n: (16)
Whenever kc > kg the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state allocation
is said to over-accumulate capital with respect to the rst-best steady state. On
the contrary, if kg > kc holds, then the free market ineciently under-accumulates
capital.
Only in a knife-edge case would the competitive equilibrium steady state coincide
with the rst-best steady state. As a matter of fact, implementing the rst-best
steady state requires a lot of power since it allocates freely the output produced each
period among the young and old alive then, without any consideration about the
productivity of the factors of production they provide to obtain it (labor and capital
respectively). It is not surprising therefore that with so much power one could in
general do better then the laissez-faire competitive outcome. Nevertheless, the next
proposition establishes (maybe more surprisingly) that whenever the competitive
equilibrium steady state of this economy is sub-optimal among all technologically
feasible steady states (i.e. whenever kc is distinct from the rst-best steady state
13This amounts to consider the problem for the whole family of economies with rst generation for
all possible levels of initial capital savings, and is equivalent, to assume that time runs from  1
to +1. With the rst interpretation above, we compare in fact steady states of a continuum of
dierent economies, while with this second interpretation one would be comparing the continuum of
steady states of a given economy. Whichever interpretation is kept, such steady states correspond
to the so-called golden age paths in Diamond (1965).
13level kg), then it is sub-optimal even among just those steady states that can be
attained through the existing markets, i.e. that remunerate factors by their marginal
productivities and require no transfers. This is interesting because it indicates that,
typically, there is room for improving upon the laissez-faire allocation even without
interfering with the working of markets or without resorting to redistributing income
across generations, as implementing the rst-best steady state typically requires.
Proposition 1. In the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy, the com-
petitive equilibrium steady state allocation of resources is sub-optimal among the
steady states attainable through the output and factors markets, whenever it is
sub-optimal among all the technologically feasible steady states.
Proof. The utility uc that every agent obtains at the competitive equilibrium steady
state with per capita savings kc solution to (8) is u(FL( k
c
1+n;l)l   kc) + u((1 +
FK( k
c








Note however that, for a constant returns to scale neoclassical production function
the derivative of  at the competitive equilibrium steady state level of per capita
savings kc is strictly negative (respectively positive) whenever at this steady state
there is over-accumulation (resp. under-accumulation) of capital with respect to
the representative agent utility-maximizing steady state level of per capita savings
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1+n;l))kc are the competitive
equilibrium steady state consumptions when young and old respectively. But at
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or, equivalently |since the right-hand side is 1 because of the homogeneity of degree








1) in the left-hand side is 1+FK( k
c
1+n;l) at the competitive steady state levels








That is to say, 0(kc) < (>)0 holds if, and only if,
kc > (<)kg (23)
because of the decreasing marginal productivity of capital. Q.E.D.
In other words, what Proposition 1 is saying is that, whenever the competitive
equilibrium steady state is not outright the rst-best one, there is another way
of saving, for all generations,14 that gives every agent a higher utility than the
competitive equilibrium steady state. Which is then the best steady state allocation
that is attainable through the existing markets for output, capital and labor? This
question is addressed in the next section.
4. The optimal steady state attainable
through the good and factors markets
If the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state can be improved upon
through the existing markets without redistributing income, but rather (as estab-
lished in Proposition 1 above) saving less in case the competitive equilibrium steady
state over-accumulates capital, or saving more in case it under-accumulates, which
level of per capita savings is such that, if chosen by all agents, would make every-
one strictly better o? The next proposition characterizes rst the steady state
that provides the highest utility to the representative agent among those attainable
through the good and factor markets.
14Provided it is the initial one, if the interpretation with a rst generation is chosen.
15Proposition 2. In the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy, the op-
timal steady state level of per capita savings k, among those attainable through
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as long as 0 < k < FL( k

1+n;l)l.15
Before we proceed with the proof of Proposition 2, a remark on condition (24)
is maybe in order. Recall that the competitive equilibrium steady state could be
Pareto-improved upon because in it the agents failed to take into account the impact
that their own saving decisions had on their returns. In condition (24) this impact is
accounted for by the derivative with respect to savings of the marginal productivity
of capital, i.e. FKK( k

1+n;l) in the right-hand side. As a matter of fact, should one
drop these derivatives, condition (24) would revert to condition (8).
Proof of Proposition2. In eect, rstly the steady state utility  dened in (17) is


































(1 + n)2] < 0
(25)
|where c0 = FL( k
1+n;l)l k and c1 = (1+FK( k
1+n;l))k| given that all the terms
are negative since
FLKK(K;L) = (1   )(   1)K 2L  < 0 (26)
and
2FKK(K;L) + FKKK(K;L)K = 2(   1)K 2L1  < 0: (27)
15This is guaranteed if the utility function has the boundary behavior implied by the assumption
that the representative agent needs to consume a positive amount in each period in order to stay
alive. Additive separability has been assumed only for notational convenience.
16So that k such that 0(k) = 0 maximizes the representative agent market steady
state utility (k). Then the optimal market steady state level of capital k is
characterized by the condition 0(k) = 0, or equivalently by (24) above as long as
0 < k < FL( k

1+n;l)l, given that


































































Finally, the steady state allocation giving a consumption FL( k
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1+n;l)l   k when
young and a consumption (1 + FK( k
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Note however that the optimal steady state level of per capita savings k among
those attainable through the existing markets is not a laissez-faire competitive equi-
librium outcome, unless it is actually optimal among all feasible steady states.
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;l) = n (36)
that is to say, only if k is equal to the rst-best level of per capita savings kg. But
whenever the level of per capita savings k is distinct from the rst-best level kg,
then both are distinct from the competitive equilibrium level kc as well. Proposition
3 below states the precise way in which the three steady states relate to each other.
Proposition 3. In the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy, either
all kg, k, and kc coincide, or they all are distinct, i.e.
kc = kg , kg = k , k = kc (37)
with kc, k, and kg being the per capita level of savings at, respectively, the com-
petitive equilibrium steady state, the steady state maximizing the representative
agent utility through the good and factors markets, and the rst-best steady state.
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18so that kg = k.
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so that k = kc.
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so that kc = kg. Q.E.D.
The question now is therefore whether some government intervention can make
of the optimal steady state level of per capita savings k attainable through the
existing markets a competitive equilibrium outcome, whenever it happens to be
distinct from the rst-best one. This question is addressed in the next section.
5. Decentralization of the optimal steady state
attainable through the good and factors markets
Consider now a government with the ability to tax (or subsidize) linearly the agents
capital income as well as to distribute them a lump-sum transfer (or raise a lump-
sum tax) when old. In particular, suppose the government taxes the returns from
19savings that the agent living at t and t + 1 gets when old, letting t+1 > 0 be one
minus the tax rate (it is a subsidy if bigger than one), while distributing to him at










t + kt+1 = wtl
ct
t+1 = (1 + t+1rt+1)kt+1 + Tt+1
(42)




u0((1 + t+1rt+1)kt+1 + Tt+1)
= 1 + t+1rt+1 (43)
for a given real wage wt, a return to savings rt+1, a capital income tax (or subsidy)
rate 1 t+1, and a lump-sum transfer (or tax) Tt+1. The per capita level of savings













The next proposition characterizes the specic policy that allows to implement as
a competitive equilibrium the best steady state attainable through the existing
markets
Proposition 4. In the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy, if the
government taxes linearly the return to savings of each generation t at a rate t+1
(a subsidy if 1 < t+1) and subsidizes the second period income by a lump-sum
transfer Tt+1 (a lump-sum tax if negative), determined as functions of the previous
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if t+1 in (45) is positive, and t+1 = 0 otherwise, then the competitive equilibrium
steady state is the optimal steady state k attainable through the good and factors
20markets. At such steady state the government keeps moreover a balanced budget
every period.
Note, incidentally, that for the computation at any given period t of both the dis-
tortionary and lump-sum tax and subsidy, the scal authority uses only information
already known at the time t of choosing t+1 and Tt+1. Note also that no generation
can manipulate the determination of the government's policy, since it is determined
by what the previous generation did.
Proof of proposition 4. If the government determines in each period t the tax rate
and the lump-sum transfer as a function of the current level of capital kt (saved by
the previous generation in t   1) according to (45) above, then in the competitive
equilibrium dynamics (44) for the level of capital kt the net of tax returns in right-
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so that the steady state of the dynamics (44) is characterized precisely by the same
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Note also that at the steady state the net of tax return to savings 1+FK( k

1+n;l)
is indeed positive, which guarantees that the agents' problem is well dened (in
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From the denitions of the second period lump sum transfer Tt+1 it follows trivially
that, at the steady state, what the government withdraws (respectively, injects)
from each generation in a distortionary way is exactly oset by the resources it
injects (resp. withdraws) to that same generation in a non-distortionary way, so
that the government's budget is balanced every period. Q.E.D.
If the economy nds itself at the competitive equilibrium steady state (or, equiva-
lently, starts with a rst generation born old that is endowed with the competitive
equilibrium steady state per capita level of capital kc), there exists a scal policy
that allows to make a transition to an allocation in which every generation from the
date t of implementation of the policy onwards obtains the highest utility attainable
through the good and factor markets. The new allocation will be Pareto-superior
for sure in the case kc > kg, because the members of generation t in which the
intervention takes place also see their utility increase. This is not necessarily the
case when kg > kc, but it will also be so if, for instance the elasticity  of output
with respect to capital is close enough to 1, as shown in Section 2. This policy is
the following:
(1) announce at t that interest income will be taxed at date t + 1 at a rate
















and that a lump-sum transfer Tt+1 will be distributed to every old agent at
t + 1, with




















and make a lump-sum transfer Tt0 to every old agent at t0, with




It is straightforward to check that this policy makes all generations t0  t choose
to save exactly k. Moreover, the government budget stays balanced every period.
Of course, the implementation of this policy requires to be able to know the mar-
ginal rates of substitution of old-age consumption to young-age consumption for
the representative agent at dierent proles of consumption. This is therefore more
demanding than the implementation of the policy sustaining k (without any tran-
sition) as a steady state competitive equilibrium provided in Proposition 4 above,
since that policy only required to be able to know at each period the per capita
savings decided in the previous period.
Note also that, at the optimal steady state level of per capita savings k attainable
through the good and factor markets, if  < 1 (respectively,  > 1), the net of
tax (resp. of subsidy) interest rate FK( k

1+n;l) does not (resp. does) exceed the
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as established in Proposition 2. As a consequence, the result in Diamond (1970)
does not apply to the tax (if  < 1) or subsidy (if  > 1) rate that implements
steady state level of per capita savings k that maximizes the representative agent
utility among those attainable through the good and factor markets, both when
k < kg and when k > kg.
236. Tax or subsidize savings?
Proposition 4 above established that the optimal steady state attainable through
the good and factors markets can be attained in a decentralized way with the
appropriate tax rate (positive or negative) on savings returns coupled with some
lump-sum transfer or tax. But when exactly attaining through the existing markets
the best possible steady requires taxing savings and when subsidizing?
As the next proposition establishes, if the optimal steady state level of per capita
savings k attainable though the good and factors markets requires over-accumu-
lating capital with respect to the rst-best steady state level of per capita savings
kg, then k can only be attained taxing savings returns and distributing second
period lump-sum transfers. Conversely, if k requires under-accumulating capital
with respect to the rst-best steady state, it can only be attained subsidizing savings
returns and raising a second period lump-sum tax.
Proposition 5. In the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy, the de-
centralization of the optimal steady state level of per capita savings k attainable
through the good and factor markets as a competitive equilibrium requires taxing
(resp. subsidizing) linearly the capital income, coupled with a second period lump-
sum transfer (resp. tax) if, and only if k is bigger (resp. smaller) than the rst-best
steady state level of per capita savings kg, i.e.
 < (>)1 , kg < (>)k: (56)
Proof. Note that, at the steady state level of per capita savings k, capital revenue
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is smaller (respectively, bigger) than 1, i.e. if, and only if,
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24which (given that the denominator in the right-hand side is positive, as established








i.e. if, and only if,
k > kg: (60)
Q.E.D.
In case it may seem counterintuitive that taxing in a distortionary may allow to
improve upon the laissez-faire competitive steady state, note that what the taxation
of capital income aims at is the reduction of the overaccumulation of capital (with
respect to the unattainable rst-best) from the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium
level of per capita savings kc to a smaller level k.16 Reducing per capita savings
further below k is not ecient if factors are to be remunerated by their marginal
productivities and no redistribution can take place. Similarly, subsidizing savings
returns, but not up to the rs-best level, allows to improve upon the laissez-faire in
case it leads to excessive under-accumulation.
Appendix
Lemma. In the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy, it holds that
kc > k , kc > kg
and
kc < k , kc < kg:
with kc, k, and kg being the per capita level of savings at, respectively, the com-
petitive equilibrium steady state, the steady state maximizing the representative
agent utility through the good and factors markets, and the rst-best steady state.
16But not its complete elimination, as the rst-best would require, given the lack of a mechanism
to implement the intergenerational transfers necessary to attain it.
25Proof. Regarding claim that kc > k holds if, and only if, kc > kg, note that a
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|where the left-hand side is the slope of the representative agent indierence curve
at the competitive equilibrium steady state prole of consumptions (cc
0;cc
1) (see
Figure 1), and the right-hand side is the slope at that same point of the curve c(k)
of constant consumption proles attainable through the existing markets, both in

















1+n < 0 (in the knife-
edge case of equality, in which the slope of c(k) at kc is vertical, it cannot be that
kc > kg) would imply that the marginal rate of substitution of old-age consumption
to young-age consumption is, in absolute value, bigger than the negative of the
slope of the curve of steady state market consumptions at c(kc) (so that kc > k)
if, and only if, kg > kc, which implies kg > kc > k. Nevertheless, the optimal pol-
icy to implement k (see Proposition 5) requires, in the case kg > k, subsidizing
the return to savings in order to increase |rather than reduce| savings from its
laissez-faire competitive level kc towards the rst-best level kg, i.e. kg > k > kc
instead of kg > kc > k. Finally, from kc = k , kc = kg in Proposition 3 and the
previous result the rest of the statement follows. Q.E.D.
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